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for Salt Lake County 
Hon. Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
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10626 
l\IELVIN J. SAUNDERS, WANDA TALBOT 
SA lTNDERS, his wife, and THOMAS J. IVESTER 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Re::-;pondents adopt appellants' statement of the Na-
turp of the Case. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
Respondents adopt aprwllants' statement of the Dis-
position in the Lower Court. 
RELH~F SOUGI-l'r ON APPEAL 
Respondents are seeking affirmance of the judgmPnt 
granted by the Third District Court in and for fSalt 
Lake County, Utah, awarding judgment in favor of De-
fendants-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with appellants' statement of 
facts which are in brief as follows. 
The respondents purchased a house in Kearns, Utah, 
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract from the Appel-
lants. Respodnents traded their Equity in the Kearns 
property for an Equity in a Midvale City property by 
exchanging Quit-Claim Deeds ·with third party defendants 
(R. 3, 4). ResrJondents later learned that third party 
defendants did not in fact own any equity in the Midvale 
property and had misrepresented the Midvale property 
(R. 61). The appellants brought an action to recover 
the back payments and for an order returning the pos-
session of the property to them (R. 2). Respondents 
accepted plaintiff demands for a return of the property 
(R. 4). Thereafter appellant sought to withdraw their 
demand for possession by striking that portion of the 
complaint (R. 20). The respondents contested this with-
drawal on the ground and for the reason that the com-
plaint constituted an offer and that once that offer was 
2 
;1 ·1·<·ph•cl h:» t1H• l'Pspornl<'nt it was a binding agreement 
;1Jl(l <·onstitut(•d an irn•voeahlP eleetion of remedy and 
('Old<l not Ii<' withdrawn. rl'lw matter was heard before the 
I lo11oralil<• StPwart l\l. IT anson ~who ruled in favor of 
tl1l' n·spmHlc'nts against tlH· aPJwllants and the appellants 
app1•al(•<l. 
I 11 t!tis adion, Appellants are plaintiff and Respond-
1•11ts ar<' (frfrndants and tlw parties will he referred to 
Jwr< after as appdlants and n•spondents. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING 
THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF A REMEDY DE-
1\IAN DE D IN A COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A 
BINDING AGREEMENT AND AN IRREVOCABLE 
ELECTION OF REMEDY. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED AS A MATTER 
OF RIGHT TO AMEND OR STRIKE THEIR PLEAD-




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING 
THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF A REMEDY DE-
1\IANDED IN A COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A 
BIN DING AGREEMENT AND AN IRREVOCABLE 
ELECTION OF REMEDY. 
[{<'spondents fail to :;:we why demand for judgment 
in a eomplaint is lf~ss binding upon appellant after the 
:-;1111ie has been arcepted, than an offer and acceptance 
in n•gard to nny contract 1'7 C. J. S. 362. 
3 
If Appellant sellors had sc'nt a letter to respond(·nl 
purchasers of Real Pro1wrt~- asking in the alternativfl 
for a cancellation of the contract and retnrn of 1hP 
possession of the property or for the re-instating of thri 
contract and retention of the possession of the property 
by bringing the payments to date, and respondent pur-
chasers ans\vered accepting the eancPllation and tendered 
possession to the appellant sPllers, wonld the appellant 
sellers than be able to prevail upon the alternative remedy 
of recovery of the back payments? Basic contract law 
holds that once an off er has lwen accepted a binding 
agreement is formed 17 C. J. S. 3G2. ·why should formal 
pleadings be 10ss binding than any other form of com-
munication betwePn the parties? 
AppPllant argues that they did not make a valid 
election of remedy in regard to the three remedies at their 
disposal b~~cause 
(1) They did not comply with the Utah Unlawful 
Detainer Statute 78-36-3 Utah Code Annotated, and admit 
that they made a mistake in their pleadings. 
(2) Respondents were not in a valid position to 
return possession, much less title. 
( 3) Remedy must be eff ecatious m order to be 
irrevocable, and the opposing party must be detriment-
ally affected in order to prevail. 
Respondent will answer each point made by appel-
lant in order of their presentation. 
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ApjH'llant ePrtainl~- dr)(>s not rn'ed to comply with 
tll!' t ·nlmd'nl Ddai1wr Ntatuks to (•vict a party under 
n I niforrn Heal Eastate Contract if tlw purchaser agrees 
to tl1e tnmination of th<> contract and returning of the 
ll(lS:~<'Ssion. rrhe eases rited by Appellant Perkins vs. 
81J1·11r·1·r, 121 T:tah ·ffi8, :2-t:l P(2) -i-rn and Vcm Zyver,den 
1. Fnrrnr. lf'l nah :M :Jfi/, :3!):1 P.2cl-1-Ci8, were rulings 
l)f tli- s c·onrt prokrting the purchasers rights before can-
r·f'llat ion of a rontrad would be• entertaint>d, this court 
n•r·op;nir.ing- tlwt tlie canc(•llahm of a contract could be, 
and often is the harshr•st n'111edy available to the sellers. 
This rl<ws not pr<>vc•nt, however, the purchaser from 
\rniving tlwsr rights and accepting sellers election if 
the purchaser so dusires. 
The appellant should not be allowed to benefit from 
its failnrt• to attPmpt to comply with the Utah Law in 
reg·anl to eyiction when the same is unnecessary in order 
to n'gain possession. 
U) Respondents do not hold the title to the re,al 
i1roperty, they merely have an equitable possessory in-
h·rest. The title rests with the appellant. 
Tlw res11ondents had traded their interest m the 
propc·rt:: under consideration to third party defendants 
h.v n·ason of frandnlrnt misrepresentations made by third 
party defendants. In order to return possession to appel-
lant which tlwy had demanded it was necessary for 
i·espondc>nts to make an elertion of remedy of either 
enn<·Plling the fradulent agreement or affirming it. 
The respond<•nts rPlying· npon appellants' eomplai 11 t 
elected to cancel the agTeP11wnt and r<>gain possession 
of the prnpert>· in order to turn it owr to ap1wllant. 
This tlw respondPnts did. rl1 he best answer I ean think 
of to appellants' argmnrnt tliat n'spondents had no right 
to turn tlw possession of tlw prn1wrty over to tlt<'m is that 
in acuality this is exactly what was accomplislu~d by thi~ 
law suit, and th0 trial judge ruled in the conclusions of 
law (R. 44). 
3. "That d0fendants and third party defendantR n•-
lied upon the election as mad(~ by the plaintiff 
to their detriment in electing to void the contract 
~with third party defendants and the Quit-Claim 
Deed, and were entitled to void said l~nit-Clairn 
Deed and agreement by reason of the fraud of 
third party defendants ... ". 
This also answers appellants argument in regard 
to detrimental reliance. Surely the judge can take into 
consideration the pleadings and actions of the parties 
during the pendency of a lmrnuit in arriving at his Con-
clusions of Law. There is no testimony of an>· detrimrnt 
on the part of respondents hut the pleadings spell out 
a detrimental course of action taken by the r0spondent 
during the course of the lawsuit that was recognized by 
the judge and taken into consideration and rightly so. 
(3) The next argument raised by appellant is that 
under the cases of State Counseling Service, Inc., r. 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 303 F(2) 
527 and llfar,rtan 1!. Hidden Splendor Mining Co. 155 F. 
Supp; 257, the remedy has to be efficatious in order to 
constitute an election. 
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'l1his arg-m11Pnt S<'Pllls to laek suhstance in regard 
in U1<> facts of tlw pr<-sPnt case. 'Vlmt remedy, of the 
tl1J'('<' nppdlants had availahlP to him, would not be con-
8'c1(•rPcl "efficatious all(l availing," particularly since 
tlwsP are the renwclies they contract for. 
\\'hat it app<>ars tlw appellant is saying is that the 
n•nwrl~, of cancvllation of tlw contract and return of the 
possvssion of tlw pro1wrt>' is not an efficatious or an 
a.rail'ng renwd>' and therefore they cannot be hound by 
an (•l<>etion of th' s r<'J;icdy. Yet this is one of the remedies 
nnder thv Uniform Real ]~state Contract that has been 
eorn;iclen·d tlw most efficat;ous and availing of any of 
the remedivs available to the sellers. What would be 
more "efficatious" than cancPllation of the contract and 
the return of the possession of it. 
Then' is conflict of authorities m regard to when 
an election of remedies is conclusive in pleadings. 
The tlrnories of election of remt>dies is well briefed 
m G A.L.R. (2) 17. In a number of cases it has been 
ht>ld as a general proposition that the commencement of 
a suit or action is of itself a conclusive election precluding 
the plaintiff from thereafter pursuing a remedy incon-
:-;istent with the first one chosen. 
The otht>r concept as stated m 6 A.L.R. (2) 2i:$ 
states that the commencement of an action is not of 
itsPlf conclusive. 
"Ht>jecting the contention that the mere commence-
ment of an action constitutes a conclusive election 
harring the subsequent prosecution of an incon-
7 
s;stent renu·dy th<• Court in ,'-.,'ilfH'r 1. Uule 11~> \I< 
SS() point<•d out that tlH· dodrirn• of <•l<·di()n 1>f 
n·mNliPs is <>ss<•ntially lmsed upon tlw d<w! 1111 , 
of Pstoppd, and h<'fon• th1• sai11<' <·an IH• i11\'okPd 
it must lw shown that tit<' a"t ion of' on<· ol' 11
1
,: 
pai·ti<•s has <·nns<·d th<· otl1n J 1art)· to <'lrnng·t· !ti:-: 
position to his detriment." 
rrh(' lTtnh Snpn·uw ( 'ourt in Cook I'. Core11-HallorJ 
Motor Comz)((11y 2;l;~ P. 1% <'l<>arl>· puts Ftah in th<· !'ir~t 
line of dPci:o-;ions holding- that the• <'OltlllH'll<'<'l:H·nt uf ,1 
snit or action is of its<>lf a eondnsiv<' t>leet'on -- not 
in the s<·cond as app<'llants would have this Court lwli<·w. 
"The trm~ rnh' S<'<'lllS to be ( 1) that tlic·n· 111u-1 
lw, in fact, t\\·o or more existing rem<c•dies uvon 
\\·hi<'h the party has tlH' rigl1t to <•l1·d: ( :.!) tlw 
n•11wdies thus OIJ<'n to h ·m must lw nlt<•rnatiw 
and in eons· st mt: and ( :~) h<• mnst liy aetualh 
hringing an action or by some other decisive act, 
\\·ith knmd<•dg<' of tlw facts, indicat<· h:s cl1oic<, 
lwtwe<'n these• in<'onsisfrnt rern<•<lies. 20 C . .T. 19 
37, and casPs then' citc'd. "With sneh Ph'lllt>nts 
present, an <'l<>etion OJH'<' clelilH:'rakly made hy 
the institut;on of a snit, by which th<' n•nl<'Cl~ 
is song-ht to lw recoyen·d, is final, alld his failme 
to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy 
which Iw has adopt<'d fnrnish<'s no }pg-al rea,;rm 
to permit him to n•sort to the other. 
.... And this conrt has held, wlwn• th<'re is a 
duty of election as to a partienlar n'medy, the 
bringing of an action based upon on0 remedy 
eonstitutes an irreyoeahl<' t>lt>ction, ex<'Ppt in ea~e 
of mistake of fact or other legal excuse." 
This case is recognized by the appellant as being thr 
leading case in this jurisdiction in this an•a of tlw lmr. 
'l'lw <·ns<' of [ 'tah Bond & Slwre Co. v. Chappel, 251 P. 
:i;,+ is just not apvlicable to the fact situation in this 
1 ·;1~<' as there was not a suit commenced in that case on an 
iiwon si st en t n•medy. 
l f tlw Cook ease is applied to the facts of this case 
as asked in arJpellants brief then the appellant clearly 
]Jad made an irrevoeahle election of n•medy when he filed 
h!s complaint and one of the remedies prayed for was 
aceepted by the respondents. 
J1~ven if the other rule as outlined in 6 A.L.R. (2) 
n Wl'l'P to be followed there Was a detrimental reliance 
and thereforp under Pither rule there has been an irre-
vocable election of n•rnedy by appellant once the alterna-
tive pleading was accepted by the respondents. This is 
what the trial court found and should be affirmed in this 
av1wal. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED AS A MATTER 
OF RIGHT TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND 
DELETE AN INCONSISTENT THEORY OF RECOV-
ERY. 
The appellant does not have an absolute right to 
amend the pleadings after they have been answered. 
Thr Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in Rule 15: 
--
"Amendments. A party may amend his pleading 
once as a matter of course at any time before 
a responsive pleading is served, or if the pleading 
is one to which no responsible pleading is per-
mitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend at any time 
within 20 days afteir it is served. Otherwise, a 
9 
party ma~- amend his pl<•ading onl:· h~· ]('UYt> 1Ji 
court or h~- writtPn cons<•nt of tlw adv<•nw ]Hnh: 
and leave shall hP fr<•<>ly givrn wh<'n justieu ,, 0 . " reqmres .... 
Tlw casc•s indicate t l1at tlw cldnrn i nation of wlii·H 
a.pleading shall he allo\\Pd to lw alll<'nd<>d is to Jw withill 
the discn•tion of tlw trial court and nnl0ss it appears tliat 
this discrc•tion has lwPn ahused and the c0111pJaiuin~· 
i1arty prejudicc>d therehy th<' courts rnling in allowing 
or denying amendnwnts will not be allmn'd on appt>ll], 
Benson v. Oregon Shoreline RaJr.oad 99 P. 107~; N c1rto11 
v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co. -±0 P(2) 204. In Bnd9er r. 
Badger 254 P. 78-± the co11rt held that courts do not lo11k 
with favor upon striking of ph~ading·s, and motions to 
strike will be granted only in a clear case. It is quite 
clear what the appellant in this case wanted to do was to 
amend his pleadings by eliminating what he then con-
sidered the undesirable remedy by striking thf' remedy 
from his pleadings. If then the trial court has the discre-
tion to allow or deny tlw amendnwnt or the strikinf!' 
portions of the appellants complaint and it does not 
appear that he abused this discretion, then the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
rrhere was in fact an off er made to the defendants 
by the plaintiffs in their complaint to either terminate 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract by returning he pos 
session or in the alternative to reinstate the contract 
bringing up to date the back payments. When such an 
offer was made to the defendants in the complaint, the 
10 
1Ji-f1·11da11b lwd no hPsitaney to accpet the alternative 
proYdiing for tlw tennination of th<> contract and the 
11 ·tnrn of' th1· possPsion of tlw property. They then pro-
1.1·1·d1·d to tenn·nat1• an~· agT1·1·u1Pnt tlwy might have had 
11 lli third party defrndants in order to give to the 
plaintiff that which tlwy desin•d. Once the offer had been 
,1r·r·r•pt<·d, and tlw action tak<>n hy the defendants to com-
1i1~ had lwPn rnacl1•, the plaintiff should not be placed 
iJ1 a position of ehang·ing their minds and be allowed to 
n•1 owr und<•r an alternativp remedy. The trial court 
fonnd as a mattPr of law from the pleadings and the 
adion of thl' partiPs that tlw appellant had relied upon 
the plaintiff pleadings to tli<·ir dt>triment and that the 
plaintiff sould be bound by his election once it had been 
aeeepkd. Ruhstantial justice required the pleadings 
>land. 'l'lw trial court in ifa sound discretion so ruled. 
TIH· trial court should not now be overruled by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
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